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Abstract. We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assign-
ment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences
over the other students who would attend the same college. It
is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without
strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method
that nds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no
assumptions on preferences. Our method also nds certain partial
solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.
1. Introduction
The many-to-one matching model is a commonly-used model of how
workers are assigned to rms, or how students are assigned to schools.
The model assumes that students do not care who the other students
matched to the same school are. This assumption seems problematic
for two reasons. First, it is crucial to obtaining the results in the
literature: it is widely recognized that the results break down without
it. Second, while crucial, the assumption is unlikely to hold in some
important applications. Indeed, in many labor markets (such as the
academic market) the set of colleagues is an important consideration
in choosing whom to work for. In school choice, it seems that students,
and their parents, care primordially about colleagues.
In this paper, we study the matching model when students do care
about who else goes to the same school. Our approach is not (mainly)
to obtain a general structure on preferences that will guarantee exis-
tence of some solution to the model. Instead, we propose an algorithm
that will nd the solutions if they exist.
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Our approach is motivated by a certain pessimism. It seems that
general conditions for nonemptiness of the core are dicult to obtain,
and that the few that are known are very strong. We choose then to
be agnostic about the emptiness of the core; we present an algorithm
that works without any structure on preferences and that nds the core
when it exists.
A second motivation is that, in practical problems, where one needs
to devise a centralized matching procedure, it is often dicult to ver-
ify that agents' preferences satisfy this or that property. We believe
our algorithm will then be useful, as it is guaranteed to work for any
preferences.
Our main results hold without any structure on agents' preferences,
but we study the behavior of our algorithm under some restrictions on
preferences that will ensure a nonempty core. Under these restrictions
the algorithm is ecient. The algorithm also identies certain partial
solutions which may be useful when the core is empty. In a partial
solution that we call \core with singles," the agents who are matched
are matched in a stable way, and blocks can only involve agents who
are single.
In the rest of the Introduction, we relate this paper to the existing
literature.
Nearly all publications on the many-to-one model rule out that a
student may care about who her colleagues are. This is true of the
seminal papers (e.g. Gale and Shapley (1962), Kelso and Crawford
(1982), Roth (1982), Blair (1988)) as well as of the exposition of the
theory in Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
The only exceptions are the papers by Dutta and Mass o (1997) and
Revilla (2004); they present some strong conditions under which the
core will be nonempty. Dutta and Mass o essentially study lexicographic
preferences: the students either rst care about the college, then about
their colleagues, in which case the core is nonempty; or they care rst
about their colleagues and then about the college, in which case they
need additional assumptions for the core to be nonempty. Revilla gen-
eralizes Dutta and Mass o's results for couples (see below) to more gen-
eral preferences over colleages. He proves that the core is nonempty
under certain hypotheses that include a weakened version of lexico-
graphic preferences.
Our paper is also related to the literature on matching with couples
(Roth (1984), (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, page 140), Klaus and Klijn
(2005)), and Dutta and Mass o (1997). This literature is mainly moti-
vated by the role of married couples in medical-interns matching. In
Roth (1984) and Klaus and Klijn (2005), each member in a couple caresPREFERENCES OVER COLLEAGUES 3
about the school choice of his/her partner. But the model is dierent
from ours because couples make a joint decision, and care about the
school choice of a partner, even among colleges that they do not both
attend. Dutta and Mass o's (1997) model of couples is in the spirit of
our model of preferences regarding colleagues. In Section 8 we present
an extension of our model to the model with couples in Dutta and
Mass o; our algorithm can thus be used to nd all the core matchings
in that model.
For our model of matching with couples, we give a solution to Open
Problem 4 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990): when does the pairwise
stable set coincide with the core.
Ours is essentially a model of hedonic coalition formation (see e.g.
Greenberg (1994), Banerjee, Konishi, and S onmez (2001) or Bogomol-
naia and Jackson (2002)). We are able to adapt some preference re-
strictions from the coalition-formation literature and use them in our
approach. We also note that the method presented here should be easily
applicable to the study of stability in more general coalition-formation
models.
Finally, we should mention the literature on nding all core matchings-
see Guseld and Irving (1989) for an exposition. The recent paper by
Mart nez, Mass o, Neme, and Oviedo (2004) presents an algorithm for
the many-to-many case. These papers assume an absence of preferences
over colleagues.
We present our model in Section 2 and give a statement of the prob-
lem and outline of our solution. We translate nding the core into
a xed-point problem in Sections 3 and 4. In Section 5 we present
the algorithm and discuss partial solutions in Section 6. In Section 7
we restrict preferences to obtain the existence of core matchings. In
Section 8 we develop a model with couples.
2. Statement of the Problem
We state the problem by rst specifying a model of matchings with
preferences over colleagues and dening the notion of the core. We
then outline the diculties created by preferences over colleagues, and
sketch our main contributions.
2.1. The Model. There are two disjoint sets of agents, the set of n
colleges, C, and the set of m students, S. Each college c has a strict,
transitive, and complete preference P(c) over 2S. Each student s has a
strict, transitive, and complete preference P(s) over C  Ss [ f(;;;)g;
where Ss is the set of subsets of S which contain s. A preference prole
is a collection of preference relations for all colleges and students- that4 ECHENIQUE AND YENMEZ
is, an (n + m)-tuple P = (P(c1);:::;P(cn);P(s1);:::;P(sm)). A college
admissions problem is a 3-tuple hC;S;Pi.
A matching  is a mapping dened on the set C [ S which satises
for all c 2 C and s 2 S:
(1) (s) 2 C  Ss [ f(;;;)g.
(2) (c) 2 2S.
(3) If s 2 (c) then (s) = (c;(c)).
(4) If (s) = (c;S0) for some college c then (c) = S0.
Here, (s) = (;;;) means that s is not matched to any college. Sim-
ilarly, if (c) = ; then there are no students matched to college c.
Notation. Given a preference relation of a college c, P(c), and a group
of students S0, let Ch(S0;P(c)) denote the choice set of S0 according
to P(c); that is, for every A  S0 we have Ch(S0;P(c))R(c)A. Since
P(c) is strict, Ch(S0;P(c)) is well-dened.
A matching  is individually rational if (s)R(s)(;;;) for all students
s and (c) = Ch((c);P(c)) for all colleges c.
A triple hC0;S0;0i, where C0  C, S0  S and 0 is a matching, is a
block of  if the following hold:
(1) C0 [ S0 6= ;; at least one agent is involved.
(2) For all c 2 C0 and s 2 S0, 0(c) 2 2S0 and 0(s) 2 C0  S0
s [
f(;;;)g; the agents in C0[S0 can implement 0 without outside
help.
(3) For all f 2 C0 [ S0, 0(f)R(f)(f); all agents in C0 [ S0 are
weakly better of.
(4) There exists f 2 C0 [ S0 such that 0(f)P(f)(f); at least one
agent is strictly better o.
The core is the set of matchings for which there is no block, denoted
by CW(P).
Note that this denition of the core is usually called the weak core
(Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).
2.2. Problem created by preferences over colleagues. It is well-
known among specialists in matching that preferences over colleagues
creates problems for core existence. We illustrate the problems by
an example. The example has an empty core, and nothing obviously
pathological|for instance, colleges' preferences satisfy Kelso-Crawford
\substitutability." See Section 3.3 for a more substantive explanation
of the source of problems.PREFERENCES OVER COLLEAGUES 5
Example 1. Consider two colleges c1, c2 and three students s1, s2, s3






This notation means that c1 prefers fs1;s2g to fs1;s3g, fs1;s3g to
fs1g, and so on. The potential groups of students not listed are worse
for c1 than being single.
It is easy to check that, in an individually-rational matching, every







Now, 1 is blocked by hfc2g;fs2;s3g;3i, 2 is blocked by hfc1g;fs1;s2g;1i,
and 3 is blocked by hfc1g;fs1;s3g;2i.
2.3. Outline of our solution. We show that the core matchings co-
incide with the xed points of a certain function T. Motivated by the
discussion above, we do not then impose a structure on preferences
that will let us prove the existence of xed points. Instead, we present
an algorithm that nds xed points of T 2, the composition of T with
itself. The xed points of T, and thus the core matchings, are also
xed points of T 2. Our algorithm may not nd all the xed points of
T 2, but it will nd all the xed points of T|or report that the core
is empty if that is the case. Hence we have an algorithm that nds all
the matchings in the core, when it is nonempty.
When the core is empty, our algorithm identies matchings where a
subset of the agents are matched in a stable way|their assignments
will not be blocked. Other agents are left single in these matchings,
and they may block their assignments.
We present some structure on preferences that will guarantee that
the core is nonempty, and that our algorithm will nd the core quickly.
3. The Core as a set of fixed points
We present a construction that allows us to characterize the core
as the xed points of a certain function. This type of construction
has been used in the matching literature before, see Adachi (2000),
Echenique and Oviedo (2004), Fleiner (2003), Echenique and Oviedo
(2003), Hateld and Milgrom (2004), and Ostrovsky (2005).6 ECHENIQUE AND YENMEZ
A prematching is a mapping , dened on the set C [ S, which
satises, for all c 2 C and s 2 S,
(1) (s) 2 C  Ss [ f(;;;)g.
(2) (c) 2 2S.
Let  denote the set of prematchings .
Remark 1. A prematching  is a matching if and only if the following
hold: (a) If s 2 (c) then (s) = (c;(c)). (b) If (s) = (c;S0) then
(c) = S0.
We now proceed to dene a function T :  ! . Let  be a pre-
matching. We need the following constructions:
U(c;) = fS
0  S : 8s 2 S
0;(c;S
0)R(s)(s)g
V (s;) = f(c;S








That is, U(c;) is the collection of sets of students S0 so that (c;S0)
is better than their matches in , for each one of them. V (s;) is the
set of (c;S0) so that, for each student in S0nfsg, and for the college c,
the matching in which c is matched to S0 is better than their matches
in .
Now, dene T :  !  by (T)(f) = maxP(f)U(f;) if f 2 C and
(T)(f) = maxP(f)V (f;) if f 2 S. The function T takes each college
to its optimal set of students, out of those who are willing to attend
that college as a group, and each student to its optimal college-group
of students pair, out of those willing to accept him/her.
Let E(T) = f 2  :  = Tg.
The main result of this section is
Theorem 2. E(T) = CW(P).
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Section 3.2.
3.1. An intermediate notion of stability. We rst introduce a no-
tion of stability that is instrumental in obtaining our results. A pair
(B;c) 2 2S  C blocks* a matching  if B \ (c) = ; and there ex-
ists A  (c) so that for every s0 2 A [ B;(c;A [ B)P(s0)(s0) and
A[BP(c)(c). A matching is stable* if it is individually rational and
there does not exist student-group-college pair that blocks* . Denote
the set of stable* matchings by S(P).
Lemma 3. S(P) = CW(P).
The proof of Lemma 3 is in the appendix.PREFERENCES OVER COLLEAGUES 7
We isolate part of the proof of Theorem 2 as Lemma 4, as it will be
useful in other results.
Lemma 4. Let  be a matching and  = T.
(1) If (c) 6= (c) then (c;(c)) blocks* . If (s) 6= (s) then (s)
blocks* .
(2) If (c) = (c) then there is no block* (c;D) of , for any D  S.
If (s) = (s) then there is no block* (c0;D) of , for any c0 2 C
and D  S with D 3 s.
Proof. We rst prove (1). Let (c) 6= (c). That  is a matching im-
plies (c) 2 U(c;); so (c)P(c)(c). That (c) 2 U(c;) implies (8s 2
(c))((c;(c))R(s)(s)). But  is a matching, so (c) 6= (c) implies
that (8s 2 (c))((c;(c)) 6= (s)). Hence (8s 2 (c))((c;(c))P(s)(s))
The proof that, if (s) 6= (s), then (s) blocks* , is analogous.
We now prove (2). Let c 2 C with (c) = (c). Let D  S be such
that (8s 2 D)((c;D)R(s)(s)), then D 2 U(c;). But (c) = (c)
implies that (c)R(c)D. So (c;D) is not a block* of . Now let s 2 S
with (s) = (s). If (c0;D), with s 2 D is such that DR(c0)(c0) and
(8s0 2 Dnfsg)((c;D)R(s0)(s0)), then (c0;D) 2 V (s;). But (s) =
(s) then gives (s)R(s)(c0;D), so (c0;D) is not a block* of . 
3.2. Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 3, it is enough to prove that
S(P) = E(T).
We need to show that for every  2 E(T),  is a matching and that
it is stable* and also if  is a stable* matching then  is a xed point
of T.
Now suppose that  2 E(T). We rst show that it is a matching.
Since we already know that  is a prematching we only need to show
the following: (a)If s 2 (c) then (s) = (c;(c)). (b)If (s) = (c;S0)
then (c) = S0 by Remark 1.
(a) s 2 (c) = (T)(c) = maxP(c)fU(c;)g. Therefore, (c;(c))R(^ s)(^ s)
for all ^ s 2 (c) and in particular
(1) (c;(c))R(s)(s):
Thus, we have (c;(c)) 2 V (s;). But now (s) = (T)(s) = maxP(s)fV (s;)g.
Therefore,
(2) (s)R(s)(c;(c)):
Since P(s) is strict (1) and (2) imply that (s) = (c;(c)).
(b) (s) = (c;S0). Now, (s) = (T)(s) = maxP(s)fV (s;)g. Thus,
(s) 2 V (s;). Therefore, we have
(3) S
0R(c)(c)8 ECHENIQUE AND YENMEZ
and also that for all s0 2 S0   fsg; (c;S0)R(s0)(s0). This, along
with (s) = (c;S0) implies that S0 2 U(c;). But (c) = (T)(c) =
maxP(c)fU(c;)g. So we get
(4) (c)R(c)S
0
Since P(c) is strict (3) and (4)imply that (c) = S0.
Now, assume that (B;c) blocks* . Then, there exists A 2 (c)
such that (c;A [ B)P(s)(s) for all s 2 A [ B and A [ BP(c)(c).
This implies that A [ B 2 U(c;). Therefore, (c) = (T)(c) =
maxP(c)fU(c;)g gives us that (c)R(c)A [ B. This is a contradic-
tion to A [ BP(c)(c).
To nish the proof, we need to show that for every  2 S(P) we
have  = T. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 4. Let  = T.
Since  is stable*, there are no blocking coalitions, which implies that
(c) = (c) for every college c and (s) = (s) for every student s.
Thus,  =  = T. 
3.3. Discussion. The matching literature that uses constructions like
the T function usually proceeds by ordering prematchings and then
showing that T is monotone increasing. By application of Tarski's
xed-point theorem, then, one proves that E(T), and thus the core, is
nonempty. It may be interesting to see where that approach would fail
if applied to our model.
The order on prematchings always involves saying that a prematch-
ing 0 is larger than another prematching  if all agents on one side of
the market prefer 0 to , while the other side of the market prefers
 (see Echenique and Oviedo (2003) for a discussion of the two main
orders used). Now, if one compares T with T0 one should get that
T0 is larger than T. In the present model, that is a problem be-
cause students are choosing their best match out of sets (V (s;) and
V (s;0)) that include agents from both sides of the market. So the set
out of which students choose does not depend in a systematic way on
the prematching involved. Without preferences over colleagues, since
colleges are better o in 0, the set from which students choose shrinks,
and thus students prefer T to T0.
4. The fixed points of T 2.
We have seen that the core can be empty; thus T may not have any
xed points. However, we can prove that T 2, i.e. the composition of
T with itself, must have xed points. These may not be matchings,PREFERENCES OVER COLLEAGUES 9
let alone core matchings. But if the core is nonempty, the core match-
ings must be xed points of T 2 (and the xed points of T 2 that are
matchings must be a \partial" solution, see Section 6).
The importance of T 2 becomes clear in Section 5, where we present
an algorithm for nding xed points of T 2; an algorithm that will nd
all the xed points of T.
Consider the following partial order on prematchings.
Denition 1. Let ;0 2 ;   0 if and only if (f)R(f)0(f) for
all agents f 2 C [ S and (f)P(f)0(f) for some agent f.
Since the preferences are strict the weak partial order  associated
with  can be dened as follows:   0 if and only if  = 0 or   0.
Lemma 5. T is monotone decreasing with respect to .
Proof. Let   0. We are going to show that T0  T, that is
T0(f)  T(f) for all agents f. We split this into two cases according
to whether f is a student or a college:
Let f 2 C. Let S0 2 U(f;). Then, for all s 2 S0, (f;S0)R(s)(s).
Since   0, we have (s)R(s)0(s). Now, by transitivity we get
(f;S0)R(s)0(s) for all s 2 S0, which implies that S0 2 U(f;0). Thus,




Hence, T0(f)R(f)T(f). The proof of T0(f)R(f)T(f) when f 2 S
is analogous. 
Let 0 be the set of individually-rational prematchings. That is,

0 = f 2  : 8s 2 S;(s)R(s)(;;;) and 8c 2 C;(c)R(c);g:
When endowed with the partial order , 0 is a complete lattice be-
cause it is a product set endowed with a product order (Echenique and
Oviedo, 2004).
Note that for all  2 , T 2 0, so we can regard T as mapping 0
into 0.
Let E(T 2) = f 2  :  = T 2g.
Theorem 6. E(T 2) is a non-empty complete lattice.
Proof. Consider the partial order . We have shown in Lemma 5 that
T is monotone decreasing with respect to this partial order. Thus, if
  0 then T0  T. Now, apply the same lemma to T0 and T to
get T 2  T 20. We have that T 2 on 0 is monotone increasing, and
also that (0;) is a complete lattice. Tarski's xed point theorem
implies that (E(T 2);) is a non-empty complete lattice. 10 ECHENIQUE AND YENMEZ
Proposition 7. No two xed points of T can be ordered by .
Proof. Assume the contrary: There exist ;0 2 E(T), such that   0
and  6= 0. Now, by applying Lemma 5 to this inequality we get
T0  T- that is 0  . Since  is a preorder, we must have  = 0,
which is a contradiction. 
Proposition 8. There exist two prematchings ; 2 E(T 2) such that
for all  2 E(T)     . Moreover, if one of these two prematchings
is also a xed point of T, then T has a unique xed point.
Proof. The existence of  and  follows from Theorem 6, as a complete
lattice must have a smallest and a largest element.
Now assume that  is also a xed point of T. If there were another
xed point of T, it would also be a xed point of T 2. But by the rst
part we know that  is better than this xed point, which contradicts
Proposition 7. The case where  is a xed point of T is similar. 
Remark 2. By monotonicity of T 2, the iterations of T 2 starting at the
largest prematching in 0 will eventually reach the prematching  from
Proposition 8.
5. An Algorithm
We describe an algorithm and prove that it nds all the core match-
ings.
5.1. Description. Let f1;2;:::;n + mg be an enumeration of the el-
ements of C [ S. Given a college-admissions problem hC;S;Pi, let
hF1;F2;:::;Fm+ni denote the problem with the same sets of agents, in
which each agent's preference list is restricted to those with Ff being
the top choice for agent f. So, in hF1;F2;:::;Fm+ni , agent f nds
unacceptable the partners that were originally better than Ff.
For every agent f 2 C [ S and for every prematching , let i(f;)
denote the best choice of f that is worse than (f).
Algorithm. Find the smallest  and largest  xed points by apply-
ing T 2 repeatedly to the largest and smallest prematchings in 0, as
suggested in Remark 2, until it nds a xed point. If T =  then let
^ E = fg and the algorithm is nished. Otherwise proceed as follows: let
^ E = ;. The possible states of the algorithm are the sets of individually-
rational prematchings, and the initial state is Q = fg. While Q 6= ;
do the following subroutine.
SUBROUTINE: Set Q' = ;. For all  2 Q and for all f such that
































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. An illustration of the algorithm
STEP 1. Find the largest xed point of T 2 for the problem
h(1);:::;(f   1);i(f;);(f + 1):::;(m + n)i, call it f.
STEP 2. If f = Tf then add f to ^ E; otherwise if f   then
add f to Q'.
The algorithm is easy to explain using a picture; see Figure 1. The
set of prematchings is a product set, and  is a product order. We can
represent it as the grid on Figure 1. Note how the core matchings, the
matchings in E(T), are unordered, and the matchings in E(T 2) form a
lattice (the smallest element is hidden by the shaded area).
First iterate T 2 from the largest prematching|represented by the
upper right corner. By monotonicity of T 2 one obtains a monotone
decreasing sequence, which has to stop at a xed point . Again by
monotonicity of T 2,  must be the largest xed point of T 2. Now the
algorithm iterates T 2 in a restricted problem, the problem obtained by
setting i(f;v) as the best partner for one agent, and (f) for everyone
else. This restriction is represented by thick lines in Figure 1, to the
left and down of . By iterating T 2 we nd the largest xed point in
the restricted problem.
The procedure of restricting and nding is repeated. Note that when
a core matching is found, we know by Proposition 7 that there cannot12 ECHENIQUE AND YENMEZ
be any more core matchings down and to the left. This is illustrated
by a shaded area in Figure 1.
Each restriction changes how T operates, not just the domain of T.
The successive restrictions can make us lose xed points of T 2, but,
it turns out, not of T (Proposition 9). For example, often  = T
so that once  is eliminated,  is no longer a xed point of T 2. The
algorithm is based on Echenique's (2003) algorithm for non-cooperative
games. Echenique's algorithm searches and nds all the xed points of
a monotone function. On the other hand, our algorithm searches for the
xed points of T 2 but will in general miss some; it is only guaranteed
to nd all the xed points of T.
5.2. Results. The algorithm proceeds by restricting agents' prefer-
ences. Our rst result is that one does not lose xed points with these
restrictions.
Proposition 9. If  2 E(T) and FfR(f)(f) for all f 2 C [ S, then
 is also a xed point of T for the problem hF1;F2;:::;Fm+ni.
Proof. Let ~ T, ~ U and ~ V be the corresponding T, U, and V for the
restricted problem hF1;F2;:::;Fm+ni. Now, it is clear that U(c;) 
~ U(c;) for all c 2 C and similarly V (s;)  ~ V (s;) for all s 2 S.
Therefore, (T)(c)R(c)( ~ T)(c) for all c 2 C and (T)(s)R(s)( ~ T)(s)
for all s 2 S.
Since  is a xed point of T we have (T)(c) = (c) and (T)(s) =
(s).
Now, that  is a matching and that FfR(f)(f) for all f 2 C [ S
imply (c) 2 ~ U(c;) and (s) 2 ~ U(s;). Therefore, ( ~ T)(c)R(c)(c)
and (~ T)(s)R(s)(s).
To complete the proof we need to put together the inequalities we got:
(c) = (T)(c)R(c)( ~ T)(c)R(c)(c) and similarly (s) = (T)(s)R(s)
(~ T)(s)R(s)(s). Since R(c) and R(s) are linear orders we get that
(~ T)(s) = (s) and ( ~ T)(c) = (c). 
Theorem 10. ^ E = E(T), that is, the set ^ E produced by the algorithm
above coincides with the xed points of T which are the core matchings.
Proof. We rst show that the algorithm stops at a nite step when
Q = ;. Then we establish ^ E  E(T) and ^ E  E(T) to complete the
proof.
Since 0 is a product set, we can identify 0 with a grid. Let the
distance between each consecutive point in the grid be one unit, and
use the resulting Euclidean distance between prematchings. Let d(Q)
be the maximum of distances between each prematching in Q and PREFERENCES OVER COLLEAGUES 13
(if Q is empty let d(Q) = 0). Let Q and Q' be successive states in
the algorithm. It is clear from the denition that d(Q) > d(Q'). Note
that since 0 is a nite set d takes only a nite number of values. This
shows that, after a nite number of steps, we must get Q = ; which
means that the algorithm stops after a nite number of steps.
Now, let us show ^ E  E(T). Let  2 ^ E. This means that  = T by
Step 2. Therefore,  2 E(T) which proves ^ E  E(T).
To complete the proof we have to show that ^ E  E(T). Let  2 E(T).
We prove by induction that at every stage Q of the algorithm, either
 2 ^ E or there exists  2 Q such that   . The beginning state
is Q = fg and ^ E = ;. By the rst statement in Proposition 8 we
get    thus the initial condition is satised. Now, let Q be an
intermediate state, from applying the subroutine on a previous state
Q0. Let ^ E and ^ E0 be the associated sets of xed points. If  2 ^ E0
then  2 ^ E since ^ E  ^ E0. If not then, by the inductive hypoth-
esis, there exists  2 Q0 so that   . Now, if  =  then 
should have already been in ^ E0 since at the previous stage in Step
2 it checks for this. Therefore   . Which implies, by Proposition 9,
that there exists f so that  is a xed point of the restricted problem
h(1);:::;(f   1);i(f;);(f + 1):::;(m + n)i. Now, let 0 be the
greatest xed point of T 2 for the restricted problem. By Proposition 7,
either 0 =  or 0 is not a xed point of T. If 0 =  then  2 ^ E,
otherwise 0 2 Q and 0   completing the induction. Now, we have
shown in the previous paragraph that the algorithm ends when Q = ;.
Hence, the inductive hypothesis implies that  2 ^ E. 
6. Partial solutions
What will the algorithm deliver when the core is empty? It turns
out that the algorithm can solve the problem partially. It can identify
a subset of agents that are matched in a way that will not be blocked,
while the rest of the agents block their assignments. We call this partial
solution the core with singles.
Denition 2. A matching  is in the core with singles if, for any
block* (c;D) of , (c) = ; and (s) = (;;;) for all s 2 D.
Theorem 11. Let  be a matching. If  2 E(T 2), then  is in the core
with singles.
It is worth emphasizing that the algorithm does not confuse the core
with singles with the core. It identies the xed points of T, and
reports those as the core. But it also nds xed points of T 2 that are14 ECHENIQUE AND YENMEZ
not xed points of T, and when those are in addition matchings, by
Theorem 11, they must be in the core with singles.
Proof. Let  = T. We shall rst prove that (c) 6= ; implies that
(c) = (c), and that (s) 6= (;;;) implies that (s) = (s).
Let c 2 C be such that (c) 6= ;. Since  = T 2, we know that (c) 2
U(c;) so (c;(c))R(s)(s) for all s 2 (c). But that  is a matching
means that (c;(c)) = (s); so we have shown that (s)R(s)(s).
On the other hand, that  is a matching implies that (s) 2 V (s;).
This follows from the denition of V (s;), and that (s0) = (c;(c))
for all s 2 (c). Now, (s) = (T)(s) and (s) 2 V (s;) gives
(s)R(s)(s). But we proved that (s)R(s)(s), so (s) = (s) follows
because P(s) is strict.
Similarly,  = T 2 implies that (s) 2 V (s;) for any s 2 (c). By
the denition of V (s;), then, (c)R(c)(c). But that  is a matching
implies that (c) 2 U(c;); so (c) = (T)(c) implies (c)R(c)(c).
Hence (c) = (c).
Let (c;D) be a block* of . Item (2) of Lemma 4 implies that
(c) 6= (c) and that (8s 2 D)((s) 6= (s)). 
Corollary 12. Let  be a matching in which no agent is single. Then
 is a core matching if and only if  2 E(T 2).
Let  be a prematching. Denote by C  C the set of colleges c such
that (c;(c)) = (s) for all s 2 (c). Let S = [c2C(c). Thus the
restriction of  to C [ S is a matching.
Proposition 13. Let  2 E(T 2). Then the restriction of  to C [ S
is a core matching of hC;S;PjC[Si.
Proposition 14. Let  be in the core with singles, and let C0 and S0
denote the agents who are single in . If 0 is in the core with singles
of hC0;S0;PjC0[S0i, then the matching (;0), which matches C0 and S0
according to 0, and CnC0 and SnS0 according to , is in the core with
singles of hC;S;Pi.
Proof. Denote the matching (;0) by ^ . Suppose, by way of contradic-
tion, that there is a block* (c;S) of ^  such that the agents in (c;S)
are not single under ^ .
First, suppose that c 2 CnC0. Then S * SnS0, so there is s 2 S0 \
S. Thus SP(c)(c), as ^ (c) = (c) and P(c) is strict. If we prove that
S 2 U(c;) we have reached a contradiction, since (c) = (T)(c))
(see proof of Theorem refthm-csingles). Now, if s 2 S0 \ S, (s) =
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the other hand, if s 2 SnS0, then ^ (s) = (s) so (c;S)R(s)(s), as
(c;S) is a block of ^ .
Second, suppose that c 2 C0. Then S * S0, as (c;S) cannot be
a block of 0. Let s 2 S0 \ S; then (c;S) 2 V (s;). Now we have a
contradiction, as before, between 0(s) = (T0)(s) and (c;S) being a
block. 
Proposition 14 suggests a recursive procedure for nding a core
matching: run T 2 to nd a matching in the core with singles; put the
non-single agents aside; run T 2 in the reduced market hC0;S0;PjC0[S0i.
This procedure will, in some cases, be very fast.
7. Restrictions on preferences
7.1. The top coalition property. Banerjee, Konishi, and S onmez
(2001) study coalition-formation games, of which our model is a special
case. They introduce the so-called top-coalition property, and prove
that it is sucient for the core to be nonempty and unique. We prove
that the top-coalition property is also sucient for algorithm to nd
the core eciently (Theorem 15).
We take the following notational liberty: Let F be the set of subsets
of C [ S with at most one element from C. Let F = fcg [ ^ S 2 F
and F 0 = fc0g [ S0 2 F. If c = c0 we say that FP(c)F 0 if ^ SP(c)S0.
If s 2 ^ S \ S0 we say that FP(s)F 0 if (c; ^ S)P(s)(c0;S0). If F  S,
substitute (;;;) for (c;S) in the statement above. For all F 2 F with
f = 2 F, say that ffgP(f)F.
Denition 3. A college-admissions problem satises the weak top-
coalition property if there exists a partition (F1;F2;:::;Fk) of all the
agents, where Fi 2 F for all i, with the following property: For all
f 2 F1, F1 is the top choice in F for P(f), and for all f 2 Fi, Fi is
the top choice for P(f) over the sets F 2 F with
F  (C [ S)n [
i 1
j=1 Fj;i = 2;:::;k:
Theorem 15. If a college-admissions problem satises the weak top-
coalition property, then it has a unique core matching . Moreover, 
is the largest xed point of T 2, and if k is the cardinality of the partition
in Denition 3, then the algorithm nds  in at most k steps.
The rst statement in Theorem 15 follows from Banerjee, Konishi,
and S onmez (2001). We provide an independent proof to illustrate how
our xed-point method can be used and because we need it to prove
the second part of the theorem.16 ECHENIQUE AND YENMEZ
Proof. Let (F1;F2;:::;Fk) be a partition of C [ S which satises the
weak top-coalition property. Let  be the matching which matches
every agent in one partition to the agents in that partition. We rst
prove that  is a stable* matching.
First note that  is individually rational since for any agent f,
(f)R(f); if f 2 C or (f)R(f)(;;;) if f 2 S since ffg is also an
admissible coalition. Now,  is stable* since no agents in F1 want to
block* since F1 is their best choice, no agent in F2 wants to block* with-
out the agents in F1 since F2 is their best choice among (C[S)nF1,...,
no agent in Fk wants to block* without the agents in F1 [F2:::[Fk 1.
Uniqueness of  follows from Proposition 8 and by the next part of
this theorem that  is the largest xed point of T 2.
Now, let 0 be the largest prematching in 0. Dene k = Tk 1
inductively. Now, 0 matches each agent in F1 to F1 since F1 is their
best choice. 1 might not match each agent in F2 to F2 since F2 might
not be their best overall choice but it still keeps agents in F1 matched
to F1. However, 2 does match each agent in f 2 F2 to F2 since
each agent appearing in 1(f) is also an element of C [ S   F1 and
F2 = Ch(C[S F1;P(f)). It is easy to see with an inductive argument
that 2(i 1) matches each agent in F1 [ F2 ::: [ Fi to its corresponding
coalition for i = 1;2;:::;k. Thus 2(k 1) = . Since  is a stable*
matching 2k 1 = T =  = 2(k 1). Thus, we'll be able to get  in at
most in 2k 1 iterations using T or equivalently in at most k iterations
using T 2. 
Example 16 shows that the weak top-coalition property is not nec-
essary for the result in Theorem 15.






The following array shows the iterations of the algorithm.
s1 s2 c1 c2
0 ; ; ; ;
V (s;0)=U(c;0) (c2;S);(c2;fs1g) (c2;S);(c2;fs2g) fs1g S;fs1g;fs2g
1 = T0 (c2;S) (c2;S) fs1g S
V (s;1)=U(c;1) (c2;S) (c2;S) ; S
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By Proposition 8, T 20 is the unique core matching. The preferences
in this example do not satisfy the weak top-coalition property.
7.2. Respecting preferences. We introduce a second restriction on
preferences. The assumption is that the \projection" of any agent's
preferences to either the set of colleges, or the sets of students, be
the same. Agents can thus only dier in how they trade o dierent
colleges and students. Under this restriction, the problem turns out to
have the weak top-coalition property.
Denition 4. A preference prole P is called respecting if there exist a
preference relation PS over 2S and a preference relation PC over C [;
with the following properties:
(1) For all s 2 S, (c; ^ S)P(s)(c;S0) if and only if ^ SPSS0.
(2) For all s 2 S, (c; ^ S)P(s)(c0; ^ S) if and only if cPCc0.
(3) For all c 2 C, ^ SP(c)S0 if and only if ^ SPSS0.
(4) For all s 2 S, if ;PCc then (;;;)P(s)(c; ^ S) for all ^ S  S.
Proposition 17. If P is respecting then it satises the weak top-
coalition property.
Proof. Let F1 be the union of the top college in PC with the top group
of students in PS. Clearly, every agent in F1 prefers F1 to any other
coalition. Now, let F2 be the union of the top college in PC among
the remaining colleges with the top group of students in PS among the
remaining group of students. Continue similarly until we exhaust all
the colleges c such that cPC; or all the admissible groups of students
S0 such that S0PS;. Then let each remaining agent be a coalition on
its own. Assume that we have formed k coalitions. It is clear that
(F1;F2;:::;Fk) satises Denition 3. 
In view of Proposition 17, respecting preferences is sucient for a
unique core matching, and for the algorithm to nd this core matching
in relatively few iterations.
7.3. Monotonicity of T. Now order  by 0   if, for all c and s,
0(c)R(c)(c) and (s)R(s)0(s). This is the order normally used in
two-sided matching problems (see e.g. Adachi (2000); Fleiner (2003);
Echenique and Oviedo (2004)).
The restriction on preferences we shall consider now is that prefer-
ences are such that T is monotone increasing, when  is ordered by
0  .18 ECHENIQUE AND YENMEZ
Proposition 18. If T is monotone increasing, then E(T) is a non-
empty complete lattice. In particular, E(T) has a smallest (in ) ele-
ment , and a largest element . These satisfy, for all c and s,
(c)R(c)(c)R(c)(c)R(c)(c)
(s)R(s)(s)R(s)(s)R(s)(s);
where  and  were dened in Proposition 8.
Proof. That E(T) is a non-empty complete lattice follows from Tarski's
xed-point theorem. 
Let
[;] = f 2 
0 :     g





the corresponding order interval using order .
Proposition 8 implies that ; 2 [;], in fact that CW(P) 





If T is monotone increasing, then, and there is a unique core match-
ing , we have  =  = . So  =  = , and our algorithm nds the
unique core matching in fewer steps than the algorithm of iterating T
(called the T-algorithm in Echenique and Oviedo (2003))
7.4. Preference cycles. We show that a type of preference cycle must
be present every time a xed point of T 2 is not a core matching. So
absence of cycles is a useful restriction on preferences. There is nothing
pathological about preference cycles, though.
Denition 5. A matching problem hC;S;Pi exhibits a preference cycle
if there is a sequence ((c1;S1);(c2;S2);:::(cK;SK)) such that (c1;S1) =
(cK;SK) and, for all k = 1;:::K 1, either ck = ck+1 and Sk+1P(ck)Sk
or there is s 2 Sk \ Sk+1 such that (ck+1;Sk+1)P(s)(ck;Sk).
Theorem 19. Let  be a matching. If  = T 2 but  6= T, then
hC;S;Pi exhibits a preference cycle ((c1;S1);(c2;S2);:::(cK;SK)). More-
over, each (ck;Sk) blocks* , (ck) = ; for all k and (s) = (;;;) for
all s 2 [kSk.
Proof. Let  = T.
Step 1 Let (c) 6= (c). We shall prove that there is s 2 (c)
such that (s)P(s)(c;(c)), and that (s) blocks* . First, note that
(c) 2 U(c;), as  is a matching; this and  = T implies that
(c)P(c)(c). Now, (c) = (T)(c), since  = T 2. Then (c)P(c)(c)
implies (c) = 2 U(c;). By denition of U(c;) there must be s 2 (c)
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Further, (c) 2 U(c;) implies that (c;(c))R(s)(s). So
(s)P(s)(c;(c))R(s)(s):
Hence (s) 6= (s). By Lemma 4, (s) blocks* .
Step 2 Let (s) 6= (s). We shall prove that there is a block*
(c0;S0) of  such that either (a) c0 = (s) and S0P(s)(s) or (b) there
is ~ s 2 (s) such that (~ s)P(~ s)(s). First, that (s) = 2 V (s;) follows
analogously to ((c) 6= (c) ) (c) = 2 U(c;)) above. The denition of
V (s;) implies that either ((s))P((s))(s) or there is ~ s 2 (s) such
that (~ s)P(~ s)(s). Setting (c0;S0) = ((s);((s))) in the rst case,
and (c0;S0) = (~ s) in the second, proves the claim. That (c0;S0) is a
block* follows applying Lemma 4 as in Step 1.
Step 3 We shall construct a cycle. If there is c with (c) 6= (c),
let (c1;S1) = (c;(c)). If there is s with (s) 6= (s), let (c1;S1) =
(s). Let ((c1;S1);(c2;S2);:::(ck;Sk)) be a sequence that would be a
preference cycle if (c1;S1) = (ck;Sk), and such that either (a) (ck;Sk) =
(ck;(ck)) or (b) (ck;Sk) = (s) for some s 2 Sk.
In case (a), by Step 1, there is s 2 (ck) such that (s)P(s)(ck;(ck)).
Let (ck+1;Sk+1) = (s). Then (ck+1;Sk+1) 6= (s), and (ck+1;Sk+1)
blocks* . In case (b), by Step 2, either (ck)P(ck)Sk and (ck) blocks*
, or there is ~ s 2 Sk such that (~ s)P(~ s)(ck;Sk), and (~ s) 6= (~ s)
is a block* of . Let (ck+1;Sk+1) = (ck), or (ck+1;Sk+1) = (~ s),
respectively.
For each element (ck;Sk) in the range of the resulting sequence,
(ck;Sk) is in the image of . There are nitely many elements in the
image of , so there is some K such that (c1;S1) = (cK;SK).

Corollary 20. Let  be a matching and  2 E(T 2). If preferences do
not exhibit a preference cycle, then  is a stable* matching.
Proof. If  = T then  is stable* matching by Theorem 2. Otherwise,
 6= T which implies that hC;S;Pi exhibits a preference cycle which
is a contradiction. 
7.5. Benchmark: exhaustive search. The only alternative to our
algorithm is to perform an exhaustive search of all possible matchings,
and test whether each of them is in the core. We shall argue that our
algorithm is more ecient than performing exhaustive search.
The computational task of testing if one matching is in the core is
the same as that of computing T. To test if a matching is in the core,
one needs to see, for each agent, if there is a preferred set of possible
partners that would accept the agent. The step of forming the sets U20 ECHENIQUE AND YENMEZ
and V , and computing the most preferred element, requires the same
computation: it can be done as a search from the top down of the
agent's preference relation, testing in each case if the potential match
would accept the agent.
So the comparison with exhaustive search reduces to comparing how
many times the computation of T is done with how many times a
match is tested in exhaustive search|that is, with how many match-
ings there are in total. For this reason, our algorithm will always do at
least as well as exhaustive search.
Exhaustive search tests all matchings. It is illustrative to calculate
how many of these there are, so as to get an idea of the general infea-
sibility of performing exhaustive search. Pick k of the n colleges to be




ways. Partition the k colleges into
k nonempty sets. Each partition then generates k! dierent matchings,
as there are k! ways of assigning the elements of the partition to the k
colleges. The number of partitions of m elements in k sets is expressed











dierent matchings. For example, one can assign 1200 students to 9
colleges in 1:233  101145 dierent ways.
As we have seen, at least with the top coalition condition our algo-
rithm requires much less computation (each iteration is a computation
of T twice). The algorithm may not be quite as ecient under more
general preferences, but it probably has an important advantage over
exhaustive search, which quickly becomes, for all practical purposes,
infeasible.
8. Extension: A model with Couples.
We present an extension of our model to a model with couples. The
couples introduce a specic form of preferences over colleagues, but it
does not reduce to the one we have discussed so far. We present a
xed-point construction, similar to the one above. One can thus use
our algorithm to nd the core matchings in the model with couples,
if there are any. As a by-product, we obtain a result that may be
of independent interest: we extend the classical result in the theory
of many-to-one matchings, that under Kelso-Crawford substitutablePREFERENCES OVER COLLEAGUES 21
preferences the core coincides with a less restrictive pair-wise stable
solution. 1
We now assume that there is a subset of students that form couples.
So, for each student s in the subset that forms couples, there is one
and only one student s0 so that s forms a couple with s and s0 forms a
couple with s.
Split the set of students into two (disjoint) sets, Q and L such that
if s forms a couple with s0 they cannot both be in Q or both in L.
Thus Q and L form a partition of S that splits all couples. Suppose
now that we add a copy of the \singlehood" symbol ; to Q and L; in
a convenient abuse of notation we shall refer to the dierent copies by
the same label, ;. In the sequel, s still denotes a generic element of
S = Q [ L, while q and l denote elements of Q and L, respectively.
We extend the preferences P(c) to preferences over 2QL by: AP(c)B,
for A;B  Q  L if and only if
fl : 9qQ s.t. (l;q) 2 Ag [ fq : 9l s.t. (l;q) 2 AgP(c)fl : 9q
s.t. (l;q) 2 Bg [ fq : 9lL s.t. (l;q) 2 Bg:
Note that we abuse notation, using P(c) for the extension of c's original
preferences.
Student l 2 L have preferences P(l) over C  Q, and q 2 Q has
preferences P(q) over C  L.
A prematching is a function  on S [ C such that
(1) (l) 2 C  Q, if l 2 L and l 6= ;;
(2) (q) 2 C  L, if q 2 Q and q 6= ;;
(3) (c)  L  Q, if c 2 C.
Let V be the set of all prematchings.
A matching is a prematching such that, for all (c;l;q) 2 C LQ,
(c) 3 (l;q) ) (l 6= ; ) (l) = (c;q)) ^ (q 6= ; ) (q) = (c;l))
(l) = (c;q) ) ((c) 3 (l;q)) ^ (q 6= ; ) (q) = (c;l))
(q) = (c;l) ) ((c) 3 (l;q)) ^ (l 6= ; ) (l) = (c;q))
8.1. Stability. A matching  is individually rational if, for all c;l;q,
(c) = Ch((c);P(c)), (l)P(l)(;;;) and (q)P(q)(;;;).
Let  be a matching. A pair (c;(l;q)) is a couples-block of  if there
is some A  (c) such that
(1) A [ f(l;q)gP(c)(c)
(2) l 6= ; ) (c;q)P(l)(l)
(3) p 6= ; ) (c;l)P(q)(q)
1This is a solution to Open Problem 4 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990)22 ECHENIQUE AND YENMEZ
Note that denition of a couples-block includes the possibility that
(q;;) 2 (c) and that (c;(l;q)) blocks .
A matching is couples-stable if it is individually rational and has
no couples blocks. Denote the set of all couples-stable matchings by
Sc(P).
A pair (D;c) where D  QL and c 2 C is a block* of a matching
 if DR(c)(c), for all (l;q) 2 D (c;q)R(l)(l) and (c;l)R(q)(q), and
if one of the stated relations holds with P in place of R.
We state here without proof that the core|denoted CW(P)|is the
set of matchings for which there is no block*. The proof is very similar
to the proof of Lemma 3.
8.2. Fixed-point construction. To ease notation, when l = ; say
that (c;q)P(l)(c0;q0) holds by denition. Similarly for q = ;.
V (l;) = f(c;q) : (l;q) 2 Ch((c) [ f(l;q)g;P(c))(c;l)R(q)(q)g [ f(;;;)g
W(q;) = f(c;l) : (l;q) 2 Ch((c) [ f(l;q)g;P(c))(c;q)R(l)(l)g [ f(;;;)g
U(c;) = f(l;q) : (c;q)R(l)(l)(c;l)R(q)(q)g [ f(;;;)g
Now let T : V ! V be dened by letting T(c) = Ch(U(c;);P(c)),
and T(s) be the maximal element in V (s;) if s 2 L and in W(q;)
if q 2 Q.
Denote the set of xed points of T by E(T).
8.3. Results.
Lemma 21. If  2 E(T) then  is individually rational.
Lemma 21 follows immediately from the denition of the map T.
Proposition 22. E(T)  CW(P)  Sc((P)
Proof. That CW(P)  Sc(P) is immediate. Let  2 E(T) and suppose,
by way of contradiction, that  = 2 CW(P). Let (D;c) be a block* of
. By denition of a block*, D  U(c;). So  = T implies that
(c)R(c)D. But DR(c)(c); since (D;c) is a block*.
Now, DR(c)(c) and (c)R(c)D implies that, for all (l;q) 2 D,
(l)R(l)(c;q) and (q)R(q)(c;l). This is a contradiction with (D;c)
being a block*. 
Let c 2 C. Say that P(c) is substitutable if, for any A;B  Q  L,
if (q;l) 2 A  B, and (q;l) 2 Ch(B;P(c)) then (q;l) 2 Ch(A;P(c)).
Say that a prole (P(c))c2C is substitutable if each individual P(c) is
substitutable.
Proposition 23. If (P(c))c2C is substitutable, then Sc(P) = E(T).PREFERENCES OVER COLLEAGUES 23
Proposition 23 translates into
Corollary 24. If (P(c))c2C is substitutable, then Sc(P) = CW(P).
Proof of Proposition 23. We need to prove that Sc(P)  E(T). Let
 6= T. We shall prove that  = 2 Sc(P).
First, suppose there is c such that T(c) 6= (c). Let D = Ch(U(c;);P(c)) 6=
(c). Since (c)  U(c;), because  is a matching, DP(c)(c). Since
 is individually rational, (c) = Ch((c);P(c)). So we have that
D * (c), and hence that there is (l;q) 2 Dn(c). We shall prove that
(c;(l;q)) is a couples block of . Now,
(l;q) 2 Ch(U(c;);P(c)) = Ch(U(c;) [ f(l;q)g;P(c));
and substitutability of P(c) implies that (l;q) 2 Ch((c)[f(l;q)g;P(c)),
as (c)  U(c;). Let A = Ch((c) [ f(l;q)g;P(c)) \ (c). By deni-
tion of A, it satises (1) in the denition of a couples block.
We now verify (2) and (3) in the denition of a couples block. If l 6= ;
then (l) = (c0;q0) with c 6= c0, as  is a matching and (l;q) = 2 (c). But
(l;q) 2 D  U(c;) so (c;q)R(l)(l) = (c0;q0). Preferences are strict,
so c 6= c0 implies (c;q)P(l)(l). By the same argument (3) follows.
Second, suppose that there is l such that T(l) 6= (l). Let (c;q) =
T(l). We shall prove that (c;(l;q)) is a couples block of . That
 is a matching implies (l) 2 V (l;). So the denition of T gives
(c;q)P(l)(l), requirement (2) in the denition of a couples block.
That (c;q) 2 V (l;) implies that
(l;q) 2 Ch((c) [ f(l;q)g;P(c)) (5)
(c;l)R(q)(q) (6)
Since  is a matching, (c;q) 6= (l) implies (l;q) = 2 (c), so State-
ment (5) implies Ch((c)[f(l;q)g;P(c))P(c)(c). Let A = Ch((c)[
f(l;q)g;P(c))nf(l;q)g; A satises (1) in the denition of a couples
block.
Finally, Statement (6) and that (c;q) 6= (l) implies (3) in the de-
nition of a couples block. 
Appendix: Weaker notions of stability.
We discuss brie
y pairwise stability and S(P), and prove Lemma 3
in the text. Pairwise stability has been studied widely in many-to-one
matchings without preferences over colleagues. The following is the
adaptation of pairwise stability to our model:
A pair (s;c) 2 S C is a pairwise-block of a matching  if s = 2 (c),
but s 2 Ch(fsg [ (c);P(c)) and 8s0 2 Ch(fsg [ (c);P(c)),
(c;Ch(fsg [ (c);P(c)))P(s
0)(s
0):24 ECHENIQUE AND YENMEZ
A matching  is stable if it is individually rational and there does
not exist a pairwise block of .
Notation. Given a preference prole P, we denote the set of stable
matchings by S(P).
The following simple proposition and example show that the core is
smaller than the set of pairwise stable, and may be strictly smaller.
In many-to-one models without preferences over colleagues, the two
solutions coincide if colleges' preferences are substitutable (Roth and
Sotomayor, 1990).
Proposition 25. S(P)  S(P)
Proof. Let  2 S(P). Assume that  = 2 S(P). Since  is individ-
ually rational there must be a blocking pair (s;c). Hence, 9s 2 S
such that s = 2 (c), but s 2 Ch(fsg [ (c);P(c)) and 8s0 2 Ch(fsg [
(c);P(c));(c;Ch(fsg[(c);P(c)))P(s0)(s0). Therefore, (fsg;c) blocks*
 with A = Ch(fsg[(c);P(c)) fsg. Contradiction to stability*. 
In general, S(P) can be dierent from S(P); we make this point
through an example.
Example 26. Consider three colleges C = fc1;c2;c3g and three stu-







There is only one stable* matching 1 which is 1(c1) = fs2s3g and
1(c2) = ; but there is another matching 2 which is stable and given
by 2(c1) = fs1g, 2(c2) = fs2g and 2(c3) = fs3g.
Proof of Lemma 3. First we'll show CW(P)  S(P) and then S(P) 
CW(P) to complete the proof.
Let  2 CW(P). Since C0 = fcg;S0 = ; and C0 = ;;S0 = fsg do not
satisfy the denition of a block, for any ^ ,  is individually rational.
Moreover, C0 = fcg with any S0  S and ^  do not satisfy the denition
of a block, so there cannot be any blocking pair involving c, so  is a
stable* matching.
Now we show that S(P)  CW(P) by contradiction. Assume that
there exists a matching  such that  2 S(P) and  = 2 CW(P). Hence,
there exists a coalition S0 [ C0 and ^  that satisfy the denition of aREFERENCES 25
block. Therefore, there exists f 2 S0 [ C0 so that ^ (f)P(f)(f). We
split this into two cases:
Case 1. f 2 C. Then, for all s 2 ^ (f); ^ (s)R(s)(s) by construction
of ^ . Since ^ (f)P(f)(f), ^ (f) 6= (f) which implies that ^ (s) 6= (s)
for all s 2 ^ (f). Since preferences are strict, we get that for all s 2
^ (f); ^ (s)P(s)(s). Therefore, if we let B = ^ (f)   (f) then (B;f)
blocks*  with A = ^ (f) \ (f), a contradiction to stability* of .
Case 2. f 2 S. Since  is a stable* matching, it is individually
rational. Thus, (f)R(f)(;;;) which implies together with strictness of
P(f) and ^ (f)P(f)(f) that ^ (f)P(f)(;;;). Hence, ^ (f) = (c; ^ (c))
for some college c. Moreover, fcg [ ^ (c) 2 C0 [ S0 and ^  is at least as
good as  for all agents in C0 [ S0. Since ^ (f)P(f)(f), ^ (f) 6= (f).
Therefore, ^ (s) 6= (s) for all students s 2 ^ (c) and also ^ (c) 6= (c).
Now, let B = ^ (c)   (c). Hence, the matching ^  is better for all
students in ^ (c) and also for college c. We get that (B;c) blocks* 
with A = ^ (c) \ (c). A contradiction to stability* of . 
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